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Currencies that are at a forward premium tend to depreciate. This ‘forward-
premium puzzle’ represents an egregious deviation from uncovered interest parity. We
document the properties of returns to currency speculation strategies that exploit this
anomaly. The ﬁrst strategy, known as the carry trade, is widely used by practition-
ers. This strategy involves selling currencies forward that are at a forward premium
and buying currencies forward that are at a forward discount. The second strategy
relies on a particular regression to forecast the payoﬀ to selling currencies forward.
We show that these strategies yield high Sharpe ratios which are not a compensation
for risk. However, these Sharpe ratios do not represent unexploited proﬁto p p o r t u -
nities. In the presence of microstructure frictions, spot and forward exchange rates
move against traders as they increase their positions. The resulting ‘price pressure’
drives a wedge between average and marginal Sharpe ratios. We argue that marginal
Sharpe ratios are zero even though average Sharpe ratios are positive. We display a
simple microstructure model that simultaneously rationalizes ‘price pressure’ and the
forward premium puzzle. The central feature of this model is that market makers
face an adverse selection problem that is less severe when the currency is expected to
appreciate.
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Currencies that are at a forward premium tend to depreciate. This ‘forward-premium puzzle’
represents an egregious deviation from uncovered interest parity (UIP). We document the
returns to currency speculation strategies that exploit this anomaly. The ﬁrst strategy,
known as the carry trade, is widely used by practitioners. This strategy involves selling
currencies forward that are at a forward premium and buying currencies forward that are at
a forward discount. The second strategy relies on a particular regression to forecast the payoﬀ
to selling currencies forward. We show that these strategies yield high Sharpe ratios which
are not a compensation for risk. However, these Sharpe ratios do not represent unexploited
proﬁt opportunities. In the presence of microstructure frictions, spot and forward exchange
rates move against traders as they increase their positions. The resulting ‘price pressure’
drives a wedge between average and marginal Sharpe ratios. We argue that marginal Sharpe
ratios are zero even though average Sharpe ratios are positive. Using price pressure estimates
obtained by Evans and Lyons (2002) we estimate that the expected total monthly payoﬀ to
t h ec a r r yt r a d ei s13.8 million pounds. Obtaining this payoﬀ requires a monthly bet of
2.3 billion pounds. These estimates suggest that, while the statistical failure of uncovered
interest parity is striking, the economic signiﬁcance of this failure is limited.
Easley and O’Hara (1987) show that price pressure can emerge as an equilibrium phe-
nomenon in microstructure models which stress adverse selection problems faced by market
makers. The logic of their model extends naturally to exchange rate markets. We show that
a simple microstructure model also rationalizes the ‘forward premium-depreciation puzzle.’
The central feature of this model is that market makers face an adverse selection problem
that is less severe when the currency is expected to appreciate.
We review the basic parity conditions in Section 2. In Section 3 we brieﬂy describe
statistical evidence on covered and uncovered-interest-parity conditions. We describe the
two speculation strategies that we study in Section 4 and characterize the properties of
payoﬀs to currency speculation in Section 5. In Sections 6 and 7 we study whether the
payoﬀs to currency speculation are correlated with risk and macro factors. In Section 8
we examine the consequences of price pressure for the properties of the payoﬀst oc u r r e n c y
speculation. In Section 9 we propose a microstructure model that is consistent with the
‘forward-premium puzzle’. Section 10 concludes.
12. Covered and Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
To ﬁx ideas we derive the standard covered and uncovered interest parity conditions using a
simple small-open-economy model with an exogenous endowment of a single good, Yt.T h i s






Here, Ct represents consumption, Mt denotes beginning-of-period money holdings, and
Pt denotes the price level. The momentary utility function u(.) is strictly concave, the dis-
count factor, β, is between zero and one, and E0 is the expectations operator conditional
on the information available at the beginning of time zero. It is convenient to express the
agent’s time t budget constraint in foreign currency units,
StBt+1 + B
∗





+St (Mt − Mt+1)+xt−1(Ft−1 − St)+StPt (Yt − Ct).
Here St denotes the spot exchange rate deﬁned as foreign currency units (FCU) per unit of
domestic currency. In our data exchange rates are quoted as FCU per British pound. So it is
natural for us to take the British Pound as the domestic currency. The variable Ft denotes the
forward exchange rate, expressed as FCU per British pound, for forward contracts maturing
at time t+1.T h ev a r i a b l e sBt and B∗
t denote beginning-of-period holdings of domestic and
foreign bonds, respectively. Bonds purchased at time t yield interest rates of Rt and R∗
t in
domestic and foreign currency, respectively. The variable xt denotes the number of pounds
sold forward at time t. To simplify notation we abstract from state-contingent securities.





















Relation (2.2) is known as covered-interest-rate parity. Relation (2.3) is a risk-adjusted
version of uncovered interest parity. Here λt,t h et i m et marginal utility of a FCU, is the
Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.1).
Together (2.2) and (2.3) imply that the forward rate is the expected value of the future
spot plus a risk premium,




2We pay particular attention to the case in which the covariance term is zero (covt (λt+1,S t+1)=
0) and the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate:
Ft = Et (St+1). (2.5)
There is a large literature, surveyed by Hodrick (1987) and Engel (1996), that rejects the
implications of (2.5). There is also a large literature that tests (2.4) under alternative
parameterizations of an agent’s utility function that allow for risk aversion. As far as we
know there is no utility speciﬁcation which succeeds in generating a risk premium compatible
with (2.4) (see Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (1998) for a discussion).
3. Evaluating Parity Conditions
We now describe our data set and use it to show that a version of (2.2) that incorporates
bid-ask spreads holds. We also use our data to brieﬂy review the nature of the statistical
evidence against (2.5).
Data Our data set, obtained from Datastream, consists of daily observations for bid and
ask interbank spot exchange rates, 1-month and 3-month forward exchange rates, and interest
rates at 1-month and 3-month maturities. All exchange rates are quoted in units of foreign
currency per British pound. The ask (bid) exchange rate is the rate at which a participant
in the interdealer market can buy (sell) British pounds from a currency dealer. The ask (bid)
interest rate is the rate at which agents can borrow (lend) domestic currency. Daily data
were converted into non-overlapping monthly observations (see the appendix for details). Our
data set covers the period January 1976 to December 2005 for spot and forward exchange
rates and January 1981 to December 2005 for interest rates. The countries included in the
data set are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
the U.K., and the U.S.1
Table 1 displays median bid-ask spreads for spot and forward exchange rates. The left-
hand panel reports median bid-ask spreads in percentage terms (100×ln(Ask/Bid)). The
right-hand panel reports the diﬀerence between ask and bid quotes in units of foreign cur-
rency. Three observations emerge from Table 1. First, bid-ask spreads are wider in forward
1We focus on developed-country currencies with liquid markets where currency-speculation strategies are
most easily implementable. See Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) and Lustig and Verdelhan (2006) for analyses
that include emerging markets.
3markets than in spot markets. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across currencies
in the magnitude of bid-ask spreads. Third, bid-ask spreads have declined for all curren-
cies in the post-1999 period. This drop partly reﬂects the advent of screen-based electronic
foreign-exchange dealing and brokering systems, such as Reuters’ Dealing 2000-2, launched
in 1992, and the Electronic Broking System launched in 1993.2
Covered Interest Parity To assess whether CIP holds it is critical to take bid-ask spreads
into account. We use the following notation: Sa
t and Sb
t denote the ask and bid spot exchange
rate, Fa
t and Fb
t denote the ask and bid forward exchange rate, Ra
t and Rb
t denote the ask
and bid interest rate in British pounds, and R∗a
t and R∗b
t denote the ask and bid interest rate
in foreign currency.
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t ) ≤ 0. (3.2)
Equation (3.1) implies that there is a non-positive payoﬀ (πCIP) to the “borrowing pounds
covered strategy.” This strategy consists of borrowing one pound, exchanging the pound
into foreign currency at the spot rate, investing the proceeds at the foreign interest rate,
and converting the payoﬀ into pounds at the forward rate. Equation (3.2) implies that
there is a non-positive payoﬀ (π∗
CIP) to the “borrowing foreign currency covered strategy.”
This strategy consists of borrowing one unit of foreign currency, exchanging the foreign
currency into pounds at the spot rate, investing the proceeds at the domestic interest rate,
and converting the payoﬀ into foreign currency at the forward rate. Table 2 reports statistics
for πCIP and π∗
CIP for nine currencies. We compute statistics pertaining to the Euro-legacy
currencies over the period January 1981 to December 1998. For all other currencies the
sample period is January 1981 to December 2005.
Table 2 indicates that for all nine currencies, the median value for πCIP and π∗
CIP is
negative. Also the fraction of periods in which πCIP and π∗
CIP are negative is small. Even
in periods where the payoﬀ is positive, the median payoﬀ is very small. Similar results hold
for 3-month horizon investments and the post-1994 time period.
2It took a few years for these electronic trading systems to capture large transactions volumes. We break
the sample in 1999, as opposed to in 1992 or 1993, to fully capture the impact of these trading platforms.
4Our ﬁnding that deviations from CIP are small and rare is consistent with the results in
Taylor (1987) who uses data collected at 10-minute intervals for a three-day period, Taylor
(1989) who uses daily data for selected historical periods of market turbulence, and Clinton
(1988) who uses daily data from November 1985 to May 1986.
Uncovered Interest Parity: Statistical Evidence Tests of (2.5) generally focus on the
regression:
(St+1 − St)/St = α + β (Ft − St)/St + ξt+1. (3.3)
Under the null hypothesis that (2.5) holds, α =0 , β =1 ,a n dξt+1 is orthogonal to time t
information. The rejection of this null hypothesis has been extensively documented. Table
3 reports the estimates of α and β that we obtain using our data for both 1-month and 3-
months horizons. We run these regressions using the average of bid and ask spot and forward
exchange rates. Consistent with the literature, we ﬁnd that β is consistently diﬀerent from
1.W e a l s o c o n ﬁrm the existence of the ‘forward-premium puzzle,’ i.e. point estimates of
β are negative. Under the null hypothesis (2.5), the pound should, on average, appreciate
when it is at a forward premium (Ft >S t). The negative point estimates of β imply that
t h ep o u n da c t u a l l yt e n d st od e p r e c i a t ew h e ni ti sa taf o r w a r dp r e m i u m .
There is a large literature aimed at explaining the failure of (2.5) and the forward pre-
mium puzzle. Proposed explanations include the importance of risk premia (Fama (1984)),
the interaction of risk premia and monetary policy (McCallum (1994)), statistical consid-
erations such as peso problems (Lewis (1995)) and non-cointegration of forward and spot
rates (Roll and Yan (2000) and Maynard (2003)). Additional explanations include learning
(Lewis (1995)) and biases in expectations (Frankel and Rose (1994)). More recently, Alvarez,
Atkeson, and Kehoe (2006) stress the importance of time-varying risk premia resulting from
endogenous market segmentation, while Bachetta and Van Wincoop (2006) emphasize the
implications of rational inattention for the failure of UIP.
For now we do not focus on explaining the failure of UIP. Instead our goal is to measure
the economic signiﬁcance of this failure. Our metric for signiﬁc a n c ei st h ea m o u n to fm o n e y
that can be made by exploiting deviations from UIP.
54. Two Currency-Speculation Strategies
We consider two strategies that exploit the failure of UIP. The ﬁrst strategy, known to
practitioners as the “carry trade,” involves borrowing low-interest-rate currencies, lending
high-interest-rate currencies, and not hedging the exchange rate risk. The second strategy,
suggested by Backus, Gregory, and Telmer (1993), relies on a particular regression to predict
the payoﬀ to selling currency forward. We refer to this strategy as the BGT strategy.
The Carry-Trade Strategy To describe this strategy we abstract, for the moment, from
bid-ask spreads. The carry trade consists of borrowing the low-interest-rate currency and
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An alternative version of the carry-trade strategy consists of selling the pound forward when
it is at a forward premium (Ft >S t) and buying the pound forward when it is at a forward





if Ft >S t,
if Ft <S t. (4.3)









When (2.2) holds strategy (4.1) yields positive payoﬀs if and only if strategy (4.3) has positive
payoﬀs because the two payoﬀs are proportional to one another. In this sense the strategies
are equivalent. We focus our analysis on strategy (4.3) for two reasons. First, strategy (4.3)
is generally more favorable than (4.1) because it involves lower transactions costs. Second,
our sample for forward rates is longer than that for interest rates.



















A risk-neutral agent sells the pound forward (xt > 0)w h e nFt >S t and buys the pound
forward (xt < 0)w h e nFt <S t.
We consider two versions of the carry trade distinguished by how bid-ask spreads are
treated. In both versions we normalize the size of the bet to 1 pound. In the ﬁrst version
we implement (4.3) and calculate payoﬀs assuming that agents can buy and sell currency at
the average of the bid and ask rates. We use ¯ St and ¯ Ft to denote the average of bid and ask
























if ¯ Ft ≥ ¯ St,
if ¯ Ft < ¯ St, (4.6)







W er e f e rt ot h i ss t r a t e g ya s“ c a r r yt rade without transactions costs.”
In the second version of the carry trade we take bid-ask spreads into account in deciding
whether to buy or sell pounds forward and in calculating payoﬀs. We refer to this strategy
as “carry trade with transactions costs.” While agents know Fa
t and Fb
t at time t, they must
forecast 1/Sa
t+1 and 1/Sb
t+1 to decide whether to buy or sell the pound forward. We assume
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if xt > 0,
if xt < 0,
if xt =0 .
(4.9)
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where δ is 1/2 of the average bid-ask spread computed over the previous year.
7The BGT Strategy Motivated by results in Backus, Gregory, and Telmer (1993) we use
the following regression to forecast the payoﬀ to selling pounds forward:
¡ ¯ Ft − ¯ St+1
¢
/¯ St+1 = a + b
¡ ¯ Ft − ¯ St
¢
/¯ St + ξt+1. (4.10)
The BGT strategy involves selling (buying) the pound forward when the payoﬀ predicted by
the regression is positive (negative). To avoid “look-ahead” bias, we use recursive estimates
of the coeﬃcients in (4.10), where the ﬁrst estimate is obtained using the ﬁr s t3 0d a t ap o i n t s . 4
Table 4 displays estimates of a and b computed using data at 1 and 3-month horizons
for the 9 bilateral exchange rates in our sample. For many countries the point estimate of
b is well above 1 and is not statistically diﬀerent from 3. To understand the magnitude
of the b estimates it is useful to note the close connection between regressions (4.10) and
(3.3) discussed in Fama (1984). Suppose that 1/¯ St is a martingale. Then (4.10) is roughly
equivalent to the regression:
¡ ¯ Ft − ¯ St+1
¢
/¯ St = a + b
¡ ¯ Ft − ¯ St
¢
/¯ St + ξt+1.
This equation can be re-arranged to show that: a = −α and b =1− β,w h e r eα and β are
the slope and intercept in (3.3). So our ﬁnding that β,t h es l o p ec o e ﬃcient in (3.3), is close
to −2 translates into a value of b close to 3.
As with the carry trade we report results for two versions of the BGT strategy, with and
without transactions costs. It is convenient to deﬁne
Et
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¡ ¯ Ft − ¯ St
¢
/¯ St, (4.11)


















The payoﬀ to the strategy is given by (4.7).
In the version of the BGT strategy with transactions costs, we use Et



















































The payoﬀ is given by (4.9).
4We investigate variants of the BGT strategy that use separate regressions on bid and ask rates. These
reﬁnements make little diﬀerence to our results.
85. The Returns to Currency Speculation
In this section we study the payoﬀ properties of the carry trade and the BGT trading
strategies. We consider these strategies for individual currencies as well as for portfolios of
currencies.
Table 5 reports the mean, standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio of the monthly non-
annualized payoﬀs to the two versions of the carry trade discussed in the previous section,
with and without transactions costs. We report payoﬀ statistics for the carry trade imple-
mented for individual currencies against the pound and for an equally-weighted portfolio of
the currency strategies. Table 6 is the analogue of Table 5 for the BGT strategy. To put our
results into perspective note that the monthly, non-annualized Sharpe ratio of the Standard
& Poors 500 index (S&P 500) is 0.14 for the period 1976 to 2005.
Even though bid-ask spreads are small, they have a sizable impact on the proﬁtability of
currency speculation. For example, without transactions costs the Sharpe ratio associated
with the equally-weighted portfolio is roughly 0.18 for the carry trade and 0.20 for the BGT
strategy. Incorporating bid-ask spreads reduces the Sharpe ratio to 0.13 for the carry trade
and to 0.11 for the BGT strategy. Most of the reduction results from a substantial decline
in the expected payoﬀ to the strategies.
It is sometimes argued that since bid-ask spreads are small it is reasonable to ignore
them. In one sense bid-ask spreads are small. For example, if an agent buys and sells one
pound against the U.S. dollar in the spot market he loses on average Sa − Sb =0 .0013
dollars. But in the sense relevant to a currency speculator bid-ask spreads are large. They
are of the same order of magnitude as the expected payoﬀ associated with our two currency-
speculation strategies. In the remainder of the paper we only consider strategies and payoﬀs
that take bid-ask spreads into account.
Even though Sharpe ratios including transactions costs are high, the average payoﬀst o
currency-speculation strategies are low. A speculator who bets one pound on an equally-
weighted portfolio of carry-trade strategies receives a monthly (annual) payoﬀ of 0.0025
(0.03) pounds. So, to generate an average annual payoﬀ of 1 million pounds the speculator
must bet of 33.3 million pounds every month. We conclude that to generate substantial
proﬁts speculators must wager very large sums of money.
Table 7, which reports statistics for the carry-trade and BGT payoﬀsc o m p u t e du s i n ga
common sample, shows that there are large diversiﬁcation gains from forming portfolios of
9currency strategies. For the carry-trade strategy the average Sharpe ratio across-currencies
is 0.090, while the Sharpe ratio for an equally weighted portfolio of currencies is 0.125.T h e
analogue estimates for the BGT strategy are 0.062 and 0.110, respectively.
Since there are gains to combining currencies into portfolios, it is natural to construct
portfolios that maximize the Sharpe ratio. Accordingly, we compute the portfolio frontier
and calculate the portfolio weights that maximize the Sharpe ratio. Speciﬁcally at each time























t ≥ 0,f o ra l li.
Here wi
t is the time t portfolio weight of currency i, Ri
t is the expected payoﬀ associated
with the trading strategy applied to currency i and R
p
t is the time t expected payoﬀ to the
portfolio. The variable wt represents the vector of portfolio weights. In addition, Vt is the
variance-covariance matrix of payoﬀst ot h et r a d i n gs t r a t e g ya p p l i e dt oe a c ho ft h en i n e
currencies. For the carry-trade strategy we estimate the matrix Vt recursively using data
up to time t. For the BGT strategy we take the time t estimates of ˆ a and ˆ b, recreate the
historical payoﬀs, and use these new payoﬀs to estimate Vt.
Problem (5.1) is completely standard except for the fact that we impose a non-negativity
constraint on the portfolio weights (see the appendix for details). This constraint is important
because negative weights allow agents to trade at negative bid-ask spreads, thus generating
spuriously high payoﬀs. The solution to (5.1) provides a set of portfolio weights, wt,f o re v e r y
feasible value Rp. We choose the weights that maximize the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio.
The ﬁrst row of Figure 1 displays realized returns for the equally-weighted and optimal
portfolio carry-trade strategy. The second row presents the analogue results for the BGT
strategy. Since realized payoﬀs are very volatile we display a 12 months moving average of
the diﬀerent series. Interestingly, payoﬀs to the carry-trade strategy are not concentrated in
a small number of periods. In contrast, the BGT strategy seems to do consistently better in
the early part of the sample.
10We use the realized returns to compute the cumulative realized payoﬀ to committing one
U.S. dollar in the beginning of the sample (1977 for the carry trade and 1979 for BGT) to
various currency-speculation strategies and reinvesting the proceeds at each point in time.
The agent starts with 1 U.S. dollar in his bank account and bets 1 dollar in the currency
strategy. From that point on the agent bets the balance of his bank account on the currency
strategy (recall that our currency strategies are zero-cost portfolios). The bank account
balance never becomes negative in our sample. Currency strategy payoﬀsa r ed e p o s i t e d
in the agent’s account. Balances in the account accumulate interest at the Libor. For
comparison we also display the cumulative realized payoﬀ to the S&P 500 index and the
1-month Libor. Figures 2 and 3 display the cumulative nominal returns to various trading
strategies. These ﬁgures show that all of the strategies, including the S&P 500, dominate the
Libor. More interestingly, the total cumulative return to the optimally-weighted carry-trade
strategy is very similar to that of the S&P 500. However, the volatility of the returns to
this version of the carry trade is much smaller than that of the cumulative return associated
with the S&P 500.
The last row of Table 5 reports summary statistics for the payoﬀ to the optimally-
weighted portfolio of carry trade strategies. Table 6 presents the analogue statistics for
the BGT strategy. Table 7 contrasts the Sharpe ratios of the various strategies analyzed
computed over a common sample (1979:10 to 2005:12). These Sharpe ratios are high and
are statistically diﬀerent from zero. The Sharpe ratios of the optimally-weighted portfolio
strategies are substantially higher than those of the equally-weighted portfolio strategies.
Figure 4 displays realized Sharpe ratios computed using a three-year rolling window. For
both strategies Sharpe ratios are high in the beginning of the 1970s. The optimally weighted
carry-trade strategy consistently delivers a positive Sharpe ratio except for a brief period
around 1995. In contrast the S&P 500 yields negative returns in the early 1980s and in the
2001 to 2005 period.
S of a rw eh a v ee m p h a s i z e dt h em e a na n dt h ev a r i a n c eo fc u r r e n c yp a y o ﬀs. These statistics
are suﬃcient to characterize the distribution of returns only if that distribution is normal.
We now analyze other properties of the distribution of realized payoﬀs .F i g u r e5a n d6s h o w
the distribution of payoﬀs to the carry trade and the BGT strategies implemented for each
of our nine currencies. Figure 7 is the analogue to Figures 5 and 6 but pertains to the
equally and optimally-weighted BGT and carry-trade strategy payoﬀs. We exclude from the
11distribution periods in which the trading strategy dictates no trade. We superimpose on
the empirical distribution of payoﬀs a normal distribution with the same mean and variance
as the empirical distribution. It is evident that these distributions are not normal, but
are leptokurtic, exhibiting fat tails. This impression is conﬁrmed by Table 8 which reports
skewness, excess kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera normality test. There is very little evidence
of skewness in the payoﬀ distributions but there is evidence of excess kurtosis.
One way to assess the economic signiﬁcance of these deviations from normality is to
confront a hypothetical trader with the possibility of investing in the S&P 500 and wagering

























Here Ct denotes consumption, Yt is an exogenous income endowment assumed to grow at
an annual rate of 1.9 percent, Xs
t and Xc
t are the end-of-period t − 1 investment in the
S&P 500 and in a portfolio of optimally-weighted carry-trade strategies, respectively. The
variables rs
t and rc
t are the time t realized returns to the S&P 500, and the carry trade,




t/Yt.W e a s s u m e
that rc
t and rs
t are generated by the joint empirical distribution of returns to the S&P 500
and to the optimally-weighted carry trade. We impose that the agent uses a time invariant
strategy for these ratios, that is, he sets xS
t = xS and xC
t = xC for all t.F o r σ =5we
ﬁnd that the optimal strategy is xS =0 .665, xC =1 .935. These portfolio weights imply
that investments in the optimally-weighted carry trade strategy account for 68 percent of
the investor’s expected return and roughly the same proportion of the variance of his return.
So, even though the distribution of payoﬀs to the carry trade has fatter tails than those of
a comparable normal distribution, agents still want to place very large bets on carry-trade
strategies.
We can also compare the fat tails associated with currency-speculation payoﬀsw i t ht h o s e
present in the returns to the S&P 500 for the same time period. S&P 500 returns display
higher excess kurtosis (2.2 with a standard error of 1.3) and skewness (−0.5 with a standard
error of 0.35) than the optimally-weighted portfolio of carry-trade strategies. We conclude
that fat tails are an unlikely explanation of the Sharpe ratios associated with our currency-
12speculation strategies.
6. Does Risk Explain the Sharpe Ratio of Currency Strategies?
A natural explanation for the Sharpe ratios of our currency-speculation strategies is that
currency returns are risky, in the sense of being correlated with risk factors such as con-
sumption growth. We investigate this possibility by regressing quarterly real payoﬀst oo u r
currency strategies on a variety of risk factors. These factors include per capita consumption
growth, the returns to the S&P 500, the Fama-French (1993) stock-market factors, the slope
of the yield curve computed as the yield on 10-year U.S. treasury bills minus the 3-months
U.S. treasury-bill rate, the luxury retail sales series constructed by Parker, Ait-Sahalia, and
Yogo (2004), U.S. industrial production, the FTSE 100, and per-capita U.K. consumption
growth. The ﬁrst seven factors are denominated in dollars so we convert our pound payoﬀs
into U.S. dollars at the average of bid and ask spot exchange rates to run the relevant re-
gressions. Dollar denominated nominal returns and risk factors are converted to real returns
using the U.S. consumption deﬂator for non-durables and services. Pound returns and risk
factors were deﬂated using the U.K. consumption deﬂator. See the appendix for a detailed
description of the data used in the regressions.
Table 9 reports results for regressions of real payoﬀso nr e a lr i s kf a c t o r s .O u rk e yﬁnding
is that, with a single exception, no risk factor is signiﬁcantly correlated with real payoﬀs.
The exception is the optimally-weighted carry trade, which is correlated with real UK con-
sumption growth. This correlation might explain the high Sharpe ratio associated with the
optimally-weighted carry trade as compensation for the riskiness of the associated payoﬀst o
UK investors. But this correlation cannot be used to explain the high Sharpe ratio from the
perspective of U.S. investors. We infer that risk-related explanations for the Sharpe ratios
of currency-speculation strategies are empirically implausible. This result is consistent with
the literature that shows that allowing for diﬀerent forms of risk aversion does not render
risk-adjusted UIP (2.4) consistent with the data.
7 .A r eC u r r e n c yS t r a t e g yP a y o ﬀs Correlated with Monetary Vari-
ables?
There is a large literature that emphasizes the role of monetary policy in generating devi-
ations from UIP (e.g. Grilli and Roubini (1992), McCallum (1992), and Alvarez, Atkeson,
13and Kehoe (2006)). A common theme in this literature is that monetary policy can gen-
erate time-varying risk premia. The precise transmission mechanism varies across papers.
Motivated by this literature we investigate whether real payoﬀs to the currency-speculation
strategies are correlated with various monetary variables. We begin by converting quarterly
nominal payoﬀs to our currency strategies into U.S. dollars at the average of bid and ask
spot exchange rate. We deﬂate appropriately using the U.S. consumption deﬂator for non-
durables and services. We then regress the dollar payoﬀs on the Federal Funds rate, the rate
of inﬂation, measured using the consumption deﬂator, and the growth rate of four diﬀer-
ent measures of money (M1, M2, M3, and MZM). We also regress pound payoﬀs, deﬂated
using the U.K. consumption deﬂator, on the U.K. rate of inﬂation and the U.K. 3-month
treasury-bill rate. Our results are reported in Table 10.
Inﬂation and the Fed funds rate enter signiﬁcantly in regressions for three currency-
speculation strategies, the equally-weighted carry trade, the equally-weighted BGT, and
the optimally-weighted BGT. This correlation is present at low frequencies, reﬂecting the
downward trend in inﬂation, the Fed funds rate, and the payoﬀs to the three currency-
speculation strategies. The correlation between currency-speculation payoﬀs and monetary
variables oﬀers some support for theories that emphasize the link between monetary policy
and the failure of UIP. Still, it is troubling that none of the monetary variables enter the
regression signiﬁcantly. Moreover, it is not clear that existing monetary theories can generate
a positive correlation between inﬂation and currency-speculation payoﬀs.
8. Price Pressure
Taken at face value, our results pose an enormous challenge for asset pricing theory. In
Section 5 we argue that there are currency-speculation strategies that yield much higher
Sharpe ratios than the S&P 500. Moreover, the payoﬀs to these strategies are uncorrelated
with standard risk factors. So, investors can signiﬁcantly increase their expected return, for
a given level of the variance of returns, by combining currency speculation with a passive
strategy of holding the S&P 500. The obvious question is why don’t investors massively
exploit this opportunity to the point where either the Sharpe ratio of currency-speculation
strategies falls to zero or currency-speculation payoﬀs become correlated with risk factors.
Here we use evidence from the microstructure literature to argue that, while currency
speculators do make proﬁts, there is little, if any, money left on the table. While the average
14Sharpe ratio of our currency speculation strategies is positive, the marginal Sharpe ratio is
zero.
Our basic argument builds on the literature that emphasizes the potential importance
of ‘price pressure’ in explaining the behavior of asset prices. By price pressure we mean
that the price at which investors can buy or sell an asset depends on the quantity they wish
to transact. The existence of price pressure can reﬂect a variety of microstructure frictions
such as adverse selection (Kyle (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987)) or inventory motives
(Garman (1976) and Stoll (1978)). There is an extensive literature documenting the existence
of price pressure in the stock market (see Madhavan (2000) for a survey). The literature on
price pressure in exchange rate markets is smaller because it is diﬃcult to obtain data on
trading volume. In an important paper Evans and Lyons (2002) estimate price pressure for
the DM/US dollar and Yen/US dollar markets using daily order ﬂow data collected between
May and August 1996. In their empirical model the exchange rate depends on the order
ﬂow, xt,d e ﬁned as the diﬀerence between buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders over a
one-day period. Evans and Lyons (2002) model price pressure as taking the form,
St+1 = St e
bxt+ut. (8.1)
Here ut is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean realized at the end of day t.T h ev a r i a b l e
St denotes the exchange rate quote at the beginning of day t, before trade starts. During
t h ed a yt h eo r d e rﬂow xt accumulates. The exchange rate at the close of day t is St ebxt+ut,
reﬂecting both the order ﬂow and the random shock. This rate is also the value of the
exchange rate at the beginning of time t +1 , St+1.
To understand the implications of (8.1), imagine that the ﬁrst transaction of day t is
initiated by a trader placing an inﬁnitesimally small order to be executed immediately.
Equation (8.1) implies that this order is executed at an exchange rate St. In contrast,
imagine that the ﬁrst transaction of day t is initiated by a trader placing a larger order of
size z to be executed immediately. This order is executed at an exchange rate Stebz.E v a n s
and Lyons (2002) estimate b =0 .0054, so that a buy order of 1 billion dollars increases
the execution spot exchange rate by 0.54 percent. We use Evans and Lyons’ estimate of
b to study the implications of price pressure for the average and marginal payoﬀst oo u r
currency-speculation strategies. We assume that their estimate of b applies to both bid, ask,
spot, and forward rates.
From the perspective of an individual trader a currency-speculation strategy that appears
15proﬁtable abstracting from price pressure can be unproﬁtable once price pressure is taken
into account. In addition, (8.1) implies that there is an incentive to break up a large trade
into small orders. A trader who places an order for z pounds at the beginning of t +1pays
zStebz. In contrast, if the trader divides this order into inﬁnitesimal orders and the net order
ﬂow is zero while execution occurs, he pays
R z




/b, which is lower than
zStebz.
We focus on the implications of price pressure for the proﬁtability of the carry-trade
strategy. Suppose that traders are competitive and risk neutral. To simplify suppose that
all trade takes place at the same time at the beginning of the period. If traders bet a total




















if xt > 0,
if xt < 0.
(8.2)

































The value of xt given by (8.3) is such that the expected marginal payoﬀ to an inﬁnitesimal
bet on the carry trade is zero. Equation (8.2) implies that the expected average payoﬀ is
also zero.
Now consider the case where traders break up orders into inﬁnitesimally small bets. If





























if xt > 0,
if xt < 0.
(8.4)
In equilibrium the marginal expected payoﬀ must be zero. It follows that the value of xt is
given by (8.3). This condition is the same one that xt satisﬁes when trades cannot be broken
up. Using the fact that the price pressure function (8.1) is convex it is straightforward to
show that the equilibrium average expected payoﬀ t ot h ec a r r yt r a d ei sp o s i t i v e .S oa sl o n g
as traders break up trades, price pressure can rationalize the observations that currency
speculators make proﬁts on average, but that at the margin there is no money to be made
from further speculation.
16We now investigate the quantitative diﬀerence between average and marginal Sharpe ra-
tios when traders can break up trades. We assume that orders arrive uniformly throughout
the day. We also assume that our data corresponds to mid-day quotes. These two assump-


























We suppose that agents implement the carry trade for each of the nine currencies. For each
currency and in each period agents compute the optimal xt and implement the carry-trade
strategy by breaking up the trades into inﬁnitesimally small orders. Given our assumptions,











































using the method discussed in section 3.5 Table
11 reports statistics pertaining to the average payoﬀ corresponding to this strategy. On
a v e r a g es p e c u l a t o r sp l a c eam o n t h l yb e to f2.3 billion pounds. The amounts invested are
very volatile with a standard deviation of 1.5 billion pounds. This high standard deviation is
consistent with the notion that speculative currency ﬂows are very volatile. By construction
the expected marginal payoﬀ and Sharpe ratio associated with this strategy are both zero.
However, the expected average payoﬀ and Sharpe ratio are both positive (14 million pounds
per month and 0.20 respectively).
While Evans and Lyons’ (2002) estimate of b =0 .0054 provides a convenient benchmark,
it is entirely possible that price pressure has fallen over time. To assess the sensitivity of
our results Table 11 reports statistics for values of b that are 1/2, 1/4, and 1/8 of 0.0054.A
fall in price pressure induces a proportional rise in the mean and standard deviation of bet
5The portfolio constructed in this way does not correspond to either the equally-weighted carry trade or
the optimally-weighted carry trade discussed above.
17size and in the mean and standard deviation of the payoﬀs. Once b falls to 1/8 of 0.0054
we obtain a mean monthly bet size of 18 billion pounds and average proﬁts of 110 million
pounds per month. Regardless of the value of b, the realized average Sharpe ratio is 0.202,
while the expected marginal Sharpe ratio is by construction zero.
In sum, according to our calculations, while currency speculators do make proﬁts, no
money is left on the table. Moreover, the proﬁts that speculators do make seem modest
relative to the amounts being wagered.
9. A Microstructure Model
In the previous section we argue that the amount of proﬁts that can be made from the
failure of UIP is fairly limited. Our analysis so far has not addressed the obvious question of
why this failure occurs in the ﬁrst place. In this section we present a simple microstructure
model that can account for the egregious failure of UIP associated with the forward-premium
puzzle.
Our model is an application of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) to exchange rate markets.
The stochastic process for the spot exchange rate is given by:
St+1 = St + φt + εt+1.
The variable φt represents the change in the exchange rate that is predictable based on public














There is a continuum of traders with measure 1. A fraction α of the traders are informed.
By informed we mean that these traders know εt+1 at time t. This simplifying assumption
is extreme but none of our qualitative results hinge upon it. We only require that informed
traders receive a time t signal that is informative about εt+1.
Af r a c t i o n1−α of traders are uninformed. These traders buy pounds forward whenever
the pound is expected to appreciate on the basis of public information, that is, φt > 0.T h e y
sell pounds forward when φt < 0. None of our qualitative results depend on the precise form
of this trading rule. All that we require is that uninformed traders be more likely to buy
18than sell pounds forward when φt > 0 and be more likely to sell than buy pounds forward
when φt < 0.
All trade takes place with risk-neutral market makers who have perfect commitment and
decide at time zero on price setting rules for bid and ask forward rates. The market maker
draws one trader per period from a continuum.6 The chosen trader can submit an order of
ﬁxed size x to buy or sell pounds forward. There is free entry at time zero, so the market
maker’s expected proﬁt is zero. To simplify we abstract from bid-ask spreads associated with
spot rates.
The market maker knows φt but does not know εt+1 at time t. He forms expectation of
εt+1 based on φt and on whether he receives a buy or a sell order from the trader (i.e. the
order ﬂow). There are two states of the world, φt = ¯ φ, φt = −¯ φ and in each of these states
the market maker must quote a bid and an ask forward rate. So we have to compute Fa
t (¯ φ),
Fb
t (¯ φ), Fa
t (−¯ φ),a n dFb
t (−¯ φ).H e r e Fa
t (φt) and Fb
t (φt) denotes the ask and bid forward rate
when the state is φt.
Consider Fa
t (¯ φ). To compute this variable we need to calculate the market maker’s
expectation, E(εt+1|buy, ¯ φ). Since φt = ¯ φ all uninformed traders buy the pound forward. If
εt+1 =¯ ε informed traders also buy the pound forward. So the probability that the market
maker receives a buy order when εt+1 =¯ ε,a n dφt = ¯ φ is given by,
Pr(buy|εt+1 =¯ ε, ¯ φ)=1 .
If φt = ¯ φ and εt+1 = −¯ ε, uniformed agents submit a buy order but informed agents submit
a sell order. Since there are 1−α uninformed agents, it follows that the probability that the
market maker receives a buy order when εt+1 = −¯ ε, φt = ¯ φ is,
Pr(buy|εt+1 = −¯ ε, ¯ φ)=1− α.
Using Bayes rule,
Pr(εt+1 =¯ ε|buy, ¯ φ)=
Pr(buy|εt+1 =¯ ε, ¯ φ)Pr(εt+1 =¯ ε)




.( 9 . 1 )
6The probability of a trader trading more than once at time t is zero. This property rules out strategic
considerations.
19It follows that:





Using (9.1) and (9.2) we obtain,





We now compute Fa
t (¯ φ). The zero-proﬁt condition implies that when φt = ¯ φ,t h er a t ea t
which traders can buy pounds forward from the market maker is equal to the market maker’s
expectation of the future spot rate,
F
a
t (¯ φ)=E(St+1|buy, ¯ φ)=St + ¯ φ + E(εt+1|buy, ¯ φ),




Proceeding as above we can compute the remaining forward rates, Fb
t (¯ φ), Fa
t (−¯ φ),a n d
Fb
t (−¯ φ). In the appendix we show that,
F
a






t (¯ φ)=St + ¯ φ −¯ ε,
F
a
t (−¯ φ)=St − ¯ φ +¯ ε,
F
b




Bid-ask spreads are independent of φt and constant over time, Fa(φt)−Fb(φt)=2 ¯ ε/(2−α).
In order to be consistent with the high volatility of spot exchange rates, the value of ¯ ε must
be high, and so the bid-ask spread is also high. However, the model can easily generate lower
bid-ask spreads if we introduce a group of uninformed traders that buy and sell with equal
probability.
As is standard in this class of models, informed traders make proﬁts on average at the
expense of uninformed traders. In the appendix we show that the informed traders’ expected
proﬁt, E(πi),i s ,
E(π
i)=
(1 − α)¯ ε
α +2 ( 1− α)
. (9.3)




α +2 ( 1− α)
. (9.4)




In the empirically plausible case where α is close to zero the expected loss to each uninformed
trader is vanishingly small.
The following proposition summarizes the key property of our model.
Proposition 9.1. Suppose that
¯ φ<(1 − α)¯ ε/(2 − α). (9.5)
Then the plim of β in regression (3.3) computed with data generated from our model economy
is negative. This results holds regardless of whether the regression is conducted using ask,
b i do ra na v e r a g eo fb i da n da s kf o r w a r dr a t e s( s e eA p p e n d i xf o rp r o o f ) .
To understand the intuition for this result consider the case in which all traders are
informed (α =1 ). In this case orders are completely revealing about the value of εt+1.W h e n
traders buy (sell) the market maker can infer with certainty that εt+1 =¯ ε (εt+1 = −¯ ε). So
forward rates are given by,
Fa
t = St + φt +¯ ε,
Fb
t = St + φt − ¯ ε.
The future value of εt+1 is fully reﬂected in Fa
t and Fb
t . It follows that St+1 is positively
related to Fa
t , Fb
t , and the average of these two variables. In the appendix we show that the
plim of β in regression (3.3) is one.
Now consider the case where there are informed and uninformed traders. We begin by
analyzing the relation between St+1 − St and Fa
t − St. The market maker faces less adverse
selection in setting ask rates when φt = ¯ φ than when φt = −¯ φ.W h e nφt = −¯ φ only informed
agents buy the pound forward. Therefore, when the market maker receives a buy order, he
can infer with certainty that εt+1 =¯ ε. This information is reﬂected in the forward rate which
is given by, Fa
t (−¯ φ)=St − ¯ φ +¯ ε.W h e nφt = ¯ φ both uninformed and informed agents buy
the pound forward. In this case a buy order does not necessarily mean that εt+1 =¯ ε.T h e
market maker’s expectation of εt+1 is equal to ¯ εα/(2 − α) and the forward rate is given by
Fa
t (¯ φ)=St + ¯ φ +¯ εα/(2 − α). Under our regularity conditions Fa
t (¯ φ) <F a
t (−¯ φ).S o t h e
ask forward rate is negatively related to φt. On average the pound appreciates when φt is
positive. Hence, there is a negative relation between St+1 − St and Fa
t − St.
21Similar intuition obtains for the relation between St+1 − St and Fb
t − St.T h e m a r k e t
maker faces less adverse selection in setting bid rates when φt = −¯ φ than when φt = ¯ φ.
When φt = ¯ φ only informed agents sell the pound forward. Therefore, when the market
maker receives a sell order, he can infer with certainty that εt+1 = −¯ ε. This information
is reﬂe c t e di nt h ef o r w a r dr a t e ,w h i c hi sg i v e nb y ,Fb
t (¯ φ)=St + ¯ φ − ¯ ε.W h e n φt = −¯ φ
both uninformed and informed agents sell the pound forward. In this case a sell order does
not necessarily mean that εt+1 = −¯ ε. The market maker’s expectation of εt+1 is equal to
−¯ εα/(2 − α) and the forward rate is given by Fb
t (−¯ φ)=St − ¯ φ − ¯ εα/(2 − α).U n d e ro u r
regularity conditions Fb
t (−¯ φ) >F b
t (¯ φ). So the bid forward rate is negatively related to φt.
On average the pound appreciates when φ is positive. Hence, there is a negative relation
between St+1 − St and Fb
t − St.
It is easy to imagine circumstances in which there is an important forecastable component
in exchange rate movements that is based on public information. Consider, for example
countries with high growth rates of money which lead to predictably high rates of inﬂation
and exchange rate depreciation. Here we would expect movements in φt to be large relative
to movements in εt+1 and our regularity condition (9.5) to fail. This property is a virtue
because it predicts that, for such countries, the plim of β in regression (3.3) is one. In fact
deviations from UIP are much smaller for high-inﬂation countries (see Bansal and Dahlquist
(2000)).
An important shortcoming of our model is the carry-trade strategy is not proﬁtable. In
fact, when ¯ φ<¯ ε, bid and ask forward rates are such that carry-trader speculators choose not
to trade. We conjecture that this shortcoming can be overcome by allowing for risk aversion
on the part of market makers along with the assumption that they receive a number of orders
that is ﬁnite and larger than one. We plan to pursue this conjecture in future work.
Introducing Price Pressure In section 8 we emphasize the importance of price pressure
for interpreting the returns to currency speculation. It is straightforward to modify the
model to generate price pressure as an equilibrium phenomenon. Proceeding as in Easley
and O’Hara (1987), suppose that traders can submit orders of two sizes, high (X) and low
(x). Suppose also that uninformed traders choose high or low sizes with probability 1/2,
but informed traders are more likely to submit larger orders than small orders. Under these
assumptions the bid-ask spread for small orders is smaller than the bid-ask spread for large
orders. This result reﬂects the fact that the adverse selection problem is more severe for
22larger orders than for small orders. We formally demonstrate these claims in the appendix
and discuss the form taken by the regularity condition (9.5).
10. Conclusion
In this paper we document that implementable currency-speculation strategies generate very
large Sharpe ratios and that their payoﬀs are uncorrelated with standard risk factors. We
argue that the presence of price pressure limits the size of the bets that agents choose to
place on these strategies. Our benchmark calculations, based on the Evans and Lyons (2002)
estimates of price pressure, indicate that total proﬁts from the carry trade are 13.8 million
pounds per month. Moreover, the marginal payoﬀ to the carry trade is zero so that no money
is being left on the table. So, while the statistical failure of UIP is very sharp, the amount of
money that can be made from this failure, at least with our currency-speculation strategies,
seems relatively small.
We conclude by emphasizing that our ﬁnding that payoﬀst oc u r r e n c ys p e c u l a t i o na r e
uncorrelated with risk factors cast doubts on the practice of adding risk-premia shocks to the
UIP relation in dynamic general equilibrium models. In these models, risk-premia shocks
aﬀect domestic interest rates which in turn aﬀect aggregate quantities such as consumption
and output. In the data there is little evidence that disturbances to UIP relationships
are correlated with risk factors. Introducing risk-premia shocks amounts to introducing an











Belgium 0.159 0.253 0.291 10.00 15.93 20.00 Centimes 76:01-98:12
Canada 0.053 0.096 0.111 0.10 0.20 0.23 Cents 76:01-05:12
France 0.100 0.151 0.176 1.00 1.50 1.88 Centimes 76:01-98:12
Germany 0.213 0.311 0.319 1.00 1.12 1.13 Pfennig 76:01-98:12
Italy 0.063 0.171 0.208 1.00 4.00 5.00 Lire 76:01-98:12
Japan 0.216 0.272 0.280 1.00 1.08 1.13 Yen 78:06-05:12
Netherlands 0.234 0.344 0.359 1.00 1.25 1.25 Cents 76:01-98:12
Switzerland 0.255 0.412 0.456 1.00 1.13 1.13 Centimes 76:01-05:12
USA 0.055 0.074 0.082 0.10 0.12 0.13 Cents 76:01-05:12
Euro* 0.043 0.060 0.070 0.04 0.06 0.07 Cents 99:01-05:12
Canada 0.066 0.071 0.076 0.15 0.16 0.17 Cents
Japan 0.061 0.066 0.070 0.11 0.12 0.13 Yen
Switzerland 0.087 0.094 0.103 0.21 0.22 0.24 Centimes
USA 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.04 0.04 0.05 Cents
Euro* 0.043 0.060 0.070 0.04 0.06 0.07 Cents
Results are based on daily data
*Euro quotes are Euro/USD, whereas other quotes are originally in FCU/British pound
Table 1
1999-2005
100 x ln(Ask/Bid) Foreign currency units
Median Bid-Ask Spreads
Full Sample PeriodPounds FX Pounds FX Pounds FX
Currency
Belgium -0.21 -0.22 1.92 2.19 0.12 0.14
Canada -0.11 -0.08 0.37 1.38 0.06 0.02
France -0.14 -0.12 1.00 1.00 0.26 0.07
Germany -0.23 -0.22 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.37
Italy -0.16 -0.13 0.81 0.66 0.10 0.04
Japan -0.26 -0.27 0.43 0.11 0.09 0.31
Netherlands -0.30 -0.29 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.10
Switzerland -0.32 -0.32 0.30 0.18 0.20 0.46
USA -0.07 -0.07 0.72 0.67 0.01 0.11
Average -0.20 -0.19 0.64 0.71 0.11 0.18
Belgium -0.18 -0.19 2.07 2.76 0.05 0.05
Canada -0.11 -0.09 0.48 1.00 0.12 0.01
France -0.10 -0.10 0.92 0.61 0.22 0.05
Germany -0.11 -0.11 0.31 0.08 0.14 0.28
Italy -0.16 -0.13 0.31 0.23 0.07 0.21
Japan -0.10 -0.12 0.83 0.24 0.19 0.31
Netherlands -0.11 -0.11 0.23 0.08 0.11 0.20
Switzerland -0.12 -0.12 0.42 0.31 0.17 0.17
USA -0.05 -0.05 1.25 0.62 0.01 0.13
Average -0.12 -0.12 0.76 0.66 0.12 0.16
1994:1-2005:1
Median return to Fraction of periods Median of positive





Covered Interest Arbitrage at 1-Month Horizon
to borrowing covered in
percentα β R2 α β R2
Belgium† -0.002 -1.531 0.028 -0.005 -0.625 0.008
(0.002) (0.714) (0.006) (0.669)
Canada -0.003 -3.487 0.045 -0.007 -2.936 0.072
(0.002) (0.803) (0.005) (0.858)
France† 0.000 -0.468 0.004 0.001 -0.061 0.000
(0.002) (0.589) (0.005) (0.504)
Germany† -0.005 -0.732 0.005 -0.012 -0.593 0.007
(0.003) (0.704) (0.008) (0.650)
Italy† 0.005 -0.660 0.010 0.008 -0.012 0.000
(0.002) (0.415) (0.006) (0.392)
Japan* -0.019 -3.822 0.030 -0.063 -4.482 0.100
(0.005) (0.924) (0.014) (1.017)
Netherlands† -0.009 -2.187 0.029 -0.018 -1.381 0.026
(0.004) (1.040) (0.009) (0.816)
Switzerland -0.008 -1.211 0.012 -0.020 -1.050 0.022
(0.003) (0.533) (0.008) (0.536)
USA -0.003 -1.681 0.017 -0.008 -1.618 0.037
(0.002) (0.880) (0.006) (0.865)
Regression of [S(t+1)/S(t)-1] on [F(t)/S(t)-1]
* Data for Japan begin 7/78
†  Data for Euro legacy currencies ends 12/98
Table 3
UIP Regressions, 1976-2005
1 Month Regression 3 Month Regressionab R2 ab R2
Belgium† 0.003 2.617 0.076 0.007 1.676 0.051
(0.002) (0.746) (0.006) (0.677)
Canada 0.004 4.392 0.068 0.010 3.914 0.119
(0.002) (0.815) (0.005) (0.923)
France† 0.001 1.534 0.040 0.001 1.122 0.047
(0.002) (0.590) (0.005) (0.508)
Germany† 0.005 1.689 0.024 0.014 1.542 0.045
(0.003) (0.722) (0.009) (0.682)
Italy† -0.004 1.707 0.060 -0.006 1.041 0.058
(0.002) (0.424) (0.006) (0.403)
Japan* 0.020 4.753 0.043 0.065 5.333 0.125
(0.005) (0.957) (0.015) (1.060)
Netherlands† 0.009 3.232 0.060 0.020 2.377 0.067
(0.004) (1.090) (0.010) (0.849)
Switzerland 0.008 2.130 0.035 0.021 1.954 0.067
(0.003) (0.550) (0.008) (0.556)
USA 0.004 2.584 0.038 0.011 2.503 0.079
(0.002) (0.920) (0.006) (0.940)
Regression of [F(t)/S(t+1)-1] on [F(t)/S(t)-1]
* Data for Japan begin 7/78
†  Data for Euro legacy currencies ends 12/98
Table 4
BGT Regressions, 1976-2005









Belgium* 0.0044 0.028 0.157 0.003 0.021 0.129
(0.0019) (0.002) (0.068) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.072)
Canada 0.0053 0.032 0.169 0.004 0.026 0.162
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.059) (0.0014) (0.002) (0.055)
France* 0.0054 0.027 0.201 0.003 0.023 0.142
(0.0016) (0.002) (0.060) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.066)
Germany* 0.0011 0.028 0.038 0.001 0.024 0.038
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.066) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.065)
Italy* 0.0029 0.028 0.105 0.002 0.024 0.090
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.058) (0.0014) (0.002) (0.057)
Japan† 0.0022 0.036 0.061 0.002 0.034 0.048
(0.0022) (0.003) (0.063) (0.0020) (0.003) (0.059)
Netherlands* 0.0024 0.028 0.087 0.002 0.023 0.080
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.068) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.068)
Switzerland 0.0019 0.030 0.063 0.001 0.028 0.017
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.060) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.058)
USA 0.0039 0.031 0.124 0.003 0.029 0.102
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.058) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.059)
Euro‡ 0.0014 0.021 0.066 0.002 0.018 0.091
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.083) (0.0013) (0.002) (0.079)
Average 0.0031 0.029 0.107 0.0022 0.025 0.090
Equally-weighted portfolio 0.0031 0.017 0.183 0.0025 0.020 0.125
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.061) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.057)
Optimally-weighted portfolio 0.0041 0.018 0.236 0.0042 0.021 0.196
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.059) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.053)
* Euro legacy currencies available 76:1-98:12 
† Japanese yen available 78:7-05:12 
‡ Euro available 99:1-05:12
Other currencies available 76:1-05:12
16 observations is the minimum number used to compute a covariance matrix in the optimal portfolios,
 so optimally-weighted returns are generated over period 77:04-05:12 
No Transactions Costs With Transactions Costs
Table 5









Belgium* 0.0051 0.027 0.188 0.003 0.026 0.114
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.066) (0.0017) (0.002) (0.065)
Canada 0.0060 0.031 0.194 0.004 0.029 0.133
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.055) (0.0017) (0.002) (0.057)
France* 0.0047 0.027 0.173 0.003 0.023 0.136
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.065) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.073)
Germany* 0.0012 0.028 0.043 0.001 0.022 0.031
(0.0019) (0.002) (0.070) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.067)
Italy* 0.0043 0.026 0.163 0.003 0.024 0.108
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.069) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.069)
Japan† 0.0017 0.036 0.049 0.001 0.029 0.029
(0.0020) (0.003) (0.058) (0.0017) (0.003) (0.058)
Netherlands* 0.0030 0.027 0.115 0.000 0.023 -0.002
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.065) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.067)
Switzerland 0.0018 0.029 0.064 -0.001 0.026 -0.029
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.056) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.059)
USA 0.0057 0.031 0.185 0.005 0.029 0.166
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.064) (0.0017) (0.003) (0.064)
Euro‡ -0.0011 0.021 -0.052 -0.001 0.016 -0.067
(0.0017) (0.002) (0.083) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.095)
Average 0.0032 0.028 0.112 0.0017 0.025 0.062
Equally-weighted portfolio 0.0027 0.013 0.202 0.0018 0.017 0.110
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.057) (0.0010) (0.001) (0.060)
Optimally-weighted portfolio 0.0038 0.019 0.197 0.0030 0.022 0.139
(0.0013) (0.001) (0.067) (0.0013) (0.001) (0.062)
* Euro legacy currencies available 76:1-98:12 
† Japanese yen available 78:7-05:12 
‡ Euro available 99:1-05:12
Other currencies available 76:1-05:12
30 observations is the minimum number used to run the first regression, 
so returns are generated over period 78:07-05:12
16 observations is the minimum number used to compute a covariance matrix in the optimal portfolios, 
so optimally-weighted returns are generated over period 79:10-05:12 
No Transations Costs With Transactions Costs
Returns to the BGT Strategies 76:01-05:12
Table 6Equal Weighted Optimally Weighted Difference
Carry trade 0.138 0.210 0.071
(0.060) (0.056) (0.033)




Standard errors in parenthesis.
Sharpe Ratios of Portfolio Strategies










Belgium* 0.413 4.48 238.3 0.397 3.97 167.0
(0.498) (1.12) (0.000) (0.535) (2.03) (0.000)
Canada -0.047 1.99 59.5 -0.075 0.65 6.1
(0.238) (0.59) (0.000) (0.170) (0.34) (0.047)
France* -0.006 2.27 59.1 -0.046 2.00 41.1
(0.324) (0.69) (0.000) (0.352) (0.64) (0.000)
Germany* -0.432 2.89 104.2 1.427 8.29 785.2
(0.278) (0.85) (0.000) (0.695) (3.68) (0.000)
Italy* 0.643 3.73 178.7 -0.270 2.14 49.8
(0.389) (1.50) (0.000) (0.307) (0.93) (0.000)
Japan† -1.334 7.40 848.7 -0.437 7.89 784.3
(0.539) (2.14) (0.000) (0.947) (3.56) (0.000)
Netherlands* 0.004 3.23 119.4 1.441 6.95 578.0
(0.341) (0.98) (0.000) (0.610) (3.39) (0.000)
Switzerland -0.833 2.77 156.4 1.306 5.76 547.8
(0.228) (0.83) (0.000) (0.444) (2.07) (0.000)
USA -0.527 3.62 213.1 -0.556 3.59 193.4
(0.531) (1.77) (0.000) (0.563) (1.91) (0.000)
Euro‡ -0.872 3.17 53.3 0.032 0.72 1.8
(0.540) (2.24) (0.000) (0.207) (0.75) (0.404)
Average -0.299 3.56 203.1 0.322 4.20 315.5
Equally-weighted portfolio -0.878 4.10 297.9 0.621 2.22 88.7
(0.407) (1.80) (0.000) (0.275) (0.76) (0.000)
Optimally-weighted portfolio -0.183 1.00 16.4 -0.004 1.86 45.1
(0.200) (0.37) (0.000) (0.365) (1.15) (0.000)
* Euro legacy currencies available 76:1-98:12 
† Japanese yen available 78:7-05:12 
‡ Euro available 99:1-05:12
Other currencies available 76:1-05:12
Optimally-weighted Carry Trade: 16 observations is the minimum number used to compute a covariance matrix in the 
optimal portfolios, so optimally-weighted returns are generated over period 77:04-05:12 
BGT: 30 observations is the minimum number used to run the first regression, so returns are generated over period 78:07-05:12
Optimally-weighted BGT: 16 observations is the minimum number used to compute a covariance matrix in the optimal portfolios,
so optimally-weighted returns are generated over period 79:10-05:12 
Table 8
Skewness, Kurtosis and Normality Test
With Transactions Costs With Transactions Costs
Returns to Carry Trade Returns to BGT StrategyIntercept  R
2 Intercept  R
2
U.S. Factors*
S&P500 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.039) (0.004) (0.042)
CAPM 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.013 -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.038) (0.004) (0.041)
Fama-French 0.009 -0.004 -0.017 -0.023 0.002 0.011 0.063 -0.057 0.128 0.038
(0.003) (0.051) (0.075) (0.068) (0.004) (0.051) (0.086) (0.069)
Per-capita consumption growth 0.011 -0.486 0.004 0.015 -0.312 0.001
(0.004) (0.663) (0.005) (0.720)
Luxury retail sales growth 0.006 0.021 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.044) (0.008) (0.052)
Industrial production 0.007 0.200 0.006 0.013 0.026 0.000
(0.003) (0.200) (0.004) (0.225)
U.K. Factors**
Per-capita consumption growth 0.004 0.611 0.020 0.006 1.201 0.065
(0.004) (0.403) (0.004) (0.414)
FTSE return 0.009 -0.007 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.035) (0.003) (0.041)
Intercept  R
2 Intercept  R
2
U.S. Factors*
S&P500 0.005 0.021 0.003 0.010 -0.039 0.006
(0.003) (0.041) (0.004) (0.055)
CAPM 0.006 0.010 0.001 0.010 -0.050 0.012
(0.003) (0.039) (0.004) (0.051)
Fama-French 0.005 0.024 -0.001 0.034 0.004 0.009 -0.025 -0.030 0.042 0.016
(0.003) (0.042) (0.066) (0.049) (0.004) (0.060) (0.092) (0.063)
Per-capita consumption growth 0.005 0.111 0.000 0.006 0.812 0.008
(0.004) (0.742) (0.006) (0.949)
Luxury retail sales growth 0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.007 -0.014 0.001
(0.005) (0.037) (0.006) (0.047)
Industrial production 0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.008 0.175 0.003
(0.003) (0.223) (0.004) (0.309)
U.K. Factors**
Per-capita consumption growth 0.003 0.414 0.011 0.006 0.562 0.011
(0.004) (0.330) (0.005) (0.475)
FTSE return 0.006 -0.027 0.005 0.011 -0.097 0.040
(0.003) (0.032) (0.004) (0.046)
*Nominal payoffs in pounds converted into U.S. dollars at average of bid and ask spot rates and deflated using the U.S. 
**Nominal payoffs in pounds deflated using the UK consumption deflator consumption deflator.
Slope Coefficient(s) Slope Coefficient(s)
Carry Trade Equally-Weighted Portfolio Carry Trade Optimally-Weighted Portfolio
BGT Strategy Equally-Weighted Portfolio BGT Strategy Optimally-Weighted Portfolio
Real Payoff to Currency Speculation and Risk Factors
Table 9








Fed funds rate -0.001 0.140 0.023 0.007 0.089 0.008
(0.006) (0.071) (0.007) (0.081)
Inflation -0.001 0.934 0.028 0.010 0.294 0.002
(0.006) (0.421) (0.007) (0.500)
M1 Growth 0.012 -0.238 0.011 0.016 -0.222 0.009
(0.004) (0.214) (0.004) (0.210)
M2 Growth 0.009 -0.037 0.000 0.010 0.222 0.003
(0.007) (0.398) (0.008) (0.432)
M3 Growth 0.005 0.174 0.003 0.012 0.074 0.000
(0.007) (0.351) (0.009) (0.451)
MZM Growth 0.011 -0.112 0.006 0.012 0.076 0.002
(0.004) (0.108) (0.004) (0.111)
Term Premium 0.014 -0.297 0.012 0.016 -0.183 0.004
(0.005) (0.249) (0.006) (0.288)
U.K. Variables**
Inflation 0.007 0.062 0.000 0.016 -0.273 0.006
(0.005) (0.290) (0.005) (0.297)
UK 3 Mo. T-bill rate 0.000 0.087 0.009 0.007 0.059 0.004









Fed funds rate -0.010 0.233 0.084 -0.015 0.378 0.133
(0.005) (0.076) (0.007) (0.099)
Inflation -0.005 1.145 0.052 -0.012 2.356 0.100
(0.005) (0.449) (0.007) (0.600)
M1 Growth 0.004 0.132 0.005 0.006 0.302 0.015
(0.003) (0.198) (0.004) (0.222)
M2 Growth 0.001 0.330 0.009 0.000 0.643 0.022
(0.005) (0.317) (0.006) (0.416)
M3 Growth 0.005 0.068 0.000 0.003 0.382 0.009
(0.005) (0.283) (0.007) (0.396)
MZM Growth 0.005 0.061 0.002 0.007 0.113 0.005
(0.003) (0.121) (0.005) (0.160)
Term Premium 0.006 -0.031 0.000 0.018 -0.486 0.024
(0.005) (0.252) (0.008) (0.341)
U.K. Variables**
Inflation 0.000 0.422 0.022 -0.004 1.129 0.060
(0.005) (0.331) (0.007) (0.535)
UK 3 Mo. T-bill rate -0.011 0.196 0.060 -0.016 0.297 0.080
(0.006) (0.077) (0.009) (0.100)
*Nominal payoffs in pounds converted into U.S. dollars at average of bid and ask spot rates and deflated using the U.S. 
consumption deflator.
**Nominal payoffs in pounds deflated using the UK consumption deflator.
BGT Strategy Equally-Weighted 
Portfolio
BGT Strategy Optimally-Weighted 
Portfolio










Belgium 149 230 1.28 10.6 0.121
Canada 175 224 1.79 11.9 0.151
France 276 338 1.80 16.6 0.108
Germany 299 282 0.84 13.6 0.061
Italy 389 494 3.19 22.4 0.142
Japan 406 298 2.35 19.3 0.122
Netherlands 199 190 0.68 8.3 0.082
Switzerland 383 356 1.70 18.9 0.090
USA 325 335 2.13 18.5 0.115
Euro 166 170 0.34 5.2 0.066
Portfolio with all currencies
b=0.0054 2305 1507 13.8 68.5 0.202
(185) (156) (4.1) (8.6) (0.050)
b=0.0027 4611 3014 27.7 137.0 0.202
(370) (312) (8.1) (17.3) (0.050)
b=0.00135 9222 6027 55.4 274.0 0.202
(739) (624) (16.2) (34.5) (0.050)
b=0.000675 18443 12055 110.8 548.1 0.202
(1478) (1248) (32.5) (69.0) (0.050)
Profits (millions pounds) Bet Size (millions pounds)
Table 11







Carry Trade: Equally-Weighted Portfolio







Carry Trade: Efficient Portfolio







BGT Strategy: Equally-Weighted Portfolio
Realized Returns to Currency Speculation (12 month MA) 1976-2005







BGT Strategy: Efficient Portfolio
Figure 1Figure 2














Carry Trade-Optimally WeightedFigure 3












































































Realized Sharpe Ratio: Three Year Rolling Window
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Figure 5Figure 6







Belgium    (0.18)
Payoff to BGT Strategy
(Percentage of periods with no trade in parenthesis)
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Equally Weighted Carry Trade  












Optimally Weighted Carry Trade












Equally Weighted BGT Trade    













Optimally Weighted BGT Trade  
Figure 7